By: Steven Sahiounie, journalist and political commentator
The Eastern Mediterranean is no longer just a geopolitical flashpoint—it is a global energy battleground. From Libya’s contested waters to Israel’s infrastructure race and Syria’s untapped reserves, the region is witnessing a complex struggle for control over the future of gas.
It has been seven months since Syrian President Assad fell, but the country has not yet begun major rebuilding projects. Foreign investors are touted as the likely savior of Syria’s collapsed economy. However, Syria has plenty of resources on hand to finance their transformation into one of the most modern countries in the Mediterranean region. The oil and gas under the ground and off-shore, can be utilized to rebuild ground-zero across the country after 14 years of civil war.
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the region holds an estimated 122 trillion cubic feet of gas. Syria alone may possess 28.5 trillion cubic meters—potentially making it the world’s third-largest gas exporter after Russia and Iran.
Recently, the largest oil refinery in Syria, at Banias, began fuel shipments for the first time since the fall of the Assad regime. Some have characterized this as the beginning of the Syrian recovery.
Prior to the outbreak of the 2011 civil war, Syria had been producing around 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil from proved reserves of 2.5 billion barrels. The highest production rate hit nearly 600,000 bpd, but the output began a decline due to technical deprivations in the major fields. Syria’s gas sector was equally significant, with proven reserves of 8.5 trillion cubic feet, and an output of nearly 316 billion cubic feet.
After working with Soviet experts prior to 1965, the General Company for Oil, a Syrian state institution, constructed pipelines from Sweidiyeh, Rumailan, and Karachok to a new terminal north of Tartus. The terminal was near the Homs refinery, with a production capacity of 1.5 million bpd, near to the pipeline moving Iraqi oil from Kirkuk to Banias on the coast, the oil shipment hub.
After 1974, Syria's President Hafez al-Assad contracted companies including Mobil Oil through middle-men, such as Mohamed Makhlouf, Assad's brother-in-law.
The vast discoveries in Omar and Taym fields in Deir Ez Zor, along with Tanf and smaller fields, yielded a light crude superior in density to North Sea Brent. Assad’s agreements with the foreign companies allowed companies to claim 12.5% of extracted crude.
Syrian oil production topped 700,000 bpd from Hasaka fields and areas under foreign contracts. Global oil prices had hit their peak in the 1970’s, with some markets topping out at $45 per barrel. This vast wealth coming from underground resources should have transformed Syria into a Dubai-look-alike.
US sanctions on the Oil Marketing Office forced the US companies out. When the 2011 war began, production had fallen to 380,000 bpd. The oil field infrastructure was destroyed or looted during the battles, and in the end the US-backed SDF, a Kurdish separatist militia, took possession of the wells in the northeast and held them as their private source of income.
The Syrian central government in Damascus has signed agreements with the SDF to cooperate on the energy fields as well as eventual military unity. Currently, Syria produces 80,000 bpd, with recovery research producing hope to boost capacity to 200,000 bpd, and deals to restore old fields, while exploring new ones.
Experts say Syria has promising areas of exploration in both the oil and gas sectors. Hasaka, Deir Ez Zor and Shaddadi, along with other older fields, are scheduled to be boosted up to 400,000 bpd within 12 months. The yet untapped offshore gas fields are said to be among the world’s richest. Deir Atiyah, Qara, Nabek and Qalamoun areas ofter promising potential outputs.
In order for Syria to emerge as one of the world’s biggest producers, costly investment in infrastructure is necessary. Rebuilding and expanding pipelines, dredging ports to depths required to berth super tankers, and building a third refinery in Raqaa capable to handle 300,000 bpd are among the required expenditures.
The refineries at both Homs and Banias are in desperate need to rehabilitation and refitting.
The price tag for developing fields in Hasaka, Dier Ez Zor, Shaddadi and the Conoco field could easily run into several billion dollars. This is when foreign investment is needed, with the Ministry of Energy and Oil calling for bids that offer protection to Syria, and the foreign companies.
Experts say that Russian, Chinese, European and American companies need to return to Syria, while introducing modern horizontal drilling methods to Tanf, Habari and the Mediteranean Sea. Syria could eventually emerge as a member of the oil-exporting nations.
The long-standing maritime dispute between Turkey, Greece, and Libya has resurfaced due to ongoing gas exploration in contested waters off the Libyan coast. This renewed friction comes amid heightened rhetoric and the reemergence of maritime border demarcation as a central issue in Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics.
Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through spokesperson Oncu Keçeli, reaffirmed Ankara’s commitment to the 2019 maritime border agreement signed with Libya’s Government of National Accord. Keçeli described the deal as “legitimate and in accordance with international law,” and firmly rejected Greek and European objections, stating that “Turkey will not allow its legitimate rights to be violated through unilateral actions.”
Greece, however, continues to challenge the agreement’s legitimacy. Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis announced plans to visit Libya to discuss maritime boundaries based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Turkey has not signed. Greek diplomatic sources emphasized that “selective reliance on international law does not serve stability,” and reiterated Athens’ commitment to defending its maritime rights.
The dispute intensified when the Libyan House of Representatives unexpectedly announced its intention to vote on ratifying the 2019 agreement with Turkey—despite previously opposing it. The Benghazi-based government submitted a formal request for ratification and formed a technical committee to review the deal.
Tensions escalated further after Greece issued international tenders for gas exploration south of Crete, which Tripoli deemed a violation of its sovereign rights. In response, Libya’s Government of National Unity summoned the Greek ambassador and lodged a formal protest.
Athens also announced the deployment of warships to international waters off the Libyan coast, citing the need to monitor irregular migration flows—particularly from areas like Tobruk, which have seen increased activity.
The root of the dispute lies in the 2019 Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement, which was widely rejected by Greece, Cyprus, and the European Union. The conflict reignited in October 2022 when a new memorandum of understanding granted Turkey rights to explore for gas in Libyan waters.
Israel’s Strategic Push to Expand Its Gas Sector
Amid regional instability, Israel is accelerating efforts to expand its gas and energy sector. The government is granting permits to international and domestic companies to increase drilling and exploration in its claimed economic waters, including the contested Gaza Marine field off the coast of Gaza.
This push follows the suspension of expansion projects due to the outbreak of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” war on October 7, 2023. The conflict disrupted development plans for the Leviathan, Tamar, and Karish gas fields, which were targeted during the war on both the Gaza and Lebanon fronts.
With extraction and pumping operations disrupted, the Israeli Energy Ministry—led by Director-General Yossi Dayan—intensified policy deliberations. A joint ministerial committee revealed that Israel’s gas reserves could be depleted within two decades. As a result, the committee recommended approving the expansion of the Leviathan field.
The Leviathan field is operated by: NewMed Energy (Israel) – 45%; Chevron (U.S.) – 40%; Ratio Energies (Israel) – 15%.
The partners submitted an updated plan to increase annual production from 21 to 23 billion cubic meters (bcm), a 10% boost. The expansion is expected to cost $2.4 billion. The companies are also seeking government approval to sign export contracts for over 100 bcm and plan to raise capacity to 37 bcm annually by 2026.
Israel’s Major Gas Fields
In 2023, Israel consumed 24.7 bcm of gas—13.1 bcm domestically and 11.6 bcm for export. In 2024, domestic consumption rose by 3.5%, and exports surged by 21%. However, the war disrupted the third pipeline project, delaying infrastructure expansion.
Leviathan accounted for 78% of exports, with the remainder from Tamar. All Karish gas is used locally. Chevron suspended work on the Leviathan offshore pipeline and delayed the third pipeline project. While domestic supply remains stable, exports to Egypt and Jordan are expected to decline.
As global powers and regional players vie for influence, the stakes are not just economic—they are strategic, shaping the balance of power for decades to come.
Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist.